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Suretyship Law in West Virginia
Wnm

0. Momus*

INTRODUCTION

The rules of law applicable to suretyship transactions are drawn
from many broad areas of the law. To fully understand and
comprehend the problems associated with a suretyship transaction
one must have a working knowledge of the laws relating to
contracts, negotiable instruments, property, pleading and practice
and certain equitable doctrines.
The importance of suretyship law to practitioners in West Virginia is attested to by over one hundred and fifty cases in which
the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has resolved
disputes resulting from suretyship transactions. Excluded from
this number of cases are the multitude of cases involving the application of the Statute of Frauds to certain transactions on which
one was claimed to be a surety.
It is the purpose of this article to examine the major decisions
of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia during the
first century of statehood in which problems of suretyship law
were resolved. Consideration will also be given to the provisions
of chapter 45 of the West Virginia Code which contains nearly
all the statutory law of the state with reference to suretyship law.
DEF1nvnoN OF A SURETY

A surety may be defined as a person who being liable to pay
a debt or perform an obligation is entitled, if he be required to
perform, to be indemnified by some other person who ought to
have himself performed before the surety is compelled to do so.
The relation is fixed entirely by the arrangement and equities
between the debtors or obligors and may or may not be known
to the creditor.'
SURETY AS CO-OBLIGOR

A court of law regards the surety as a co-obligor with his
principal, and in the absence of any statutory restriction, the
Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
0Johnson v. Young, 20 W. Va. 614, 657 (1882).

[3]
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creditor has the same rights against the surety that he has against
the principal debtor.2
PARoL Ev DmFCE TO Saow Sv

Tysni

RELATION

The courts of West Virginia have permitted evidence to be
introduced into proceedings to prove the relationship of principal
and surety on written contracts both sealed 3 and unsealed.4
In Creig v. Henrick parol evidence was allowed to show the
relation of principal and surety on a bond signed by three persons
followed by their seal. One of the obligors on the bond, who was
in fact a surety and who gave notice to the creditor to bring suit
on the bond but subsequently consented to the dismissal of the
action, remained bound on the obligation without the showing
of a new promise on his part.
To Whom

OBLIGATION OF A SURETY ExmNs

No person can maintain an action on a bond guaranteeing the
performance of a private contract except the obligee, his assignee
or personal representative.6 A private bond does not protect
strangers to the bond as does a bond of a public official.7 If a
bond is payable to a corporation, only the corporation may maintain an action thereon. Shareholders of the corporation have no
legal interest in the bond.8
Where a bond did not name the bank as the creditor, yet, having
evidently been executed to secure the bank against its cashier's
default, the court construed the contract according to the real
intention of the parties and permitted the bank in its corporate
capacity to maintain a suit on the bond."
In Lawhead v. Doddridge County Bank,"0 the court applied
the doctrine descriptio personae in determining to whom the
surety's liability on a bond extended. The bond in question named
2 Post v. Bailey & Co., 68 W. Va. 434, 69 S.E. 910 (1910); Riley v.
Jarvis, 43 W. Va. 43, 26 S.E. 366 (1896); Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Good, 21
W. Va. 455 (1883); Warren v. Branch, 15 W. Va. 21 (1879).
' Parsons v. Harold, 46 W. Va. 122, 32 S.E. 1002 (1899).
4 Creig v. Hendrick, 5 W. Va. 140 (1872).
56 Id. at 141.
Wait v. Homestead Bldg. Ass'n, 76 W. Va. 431, 85 S.E. 637 (1915).
7 Id. at 437, 85 S.E. at 640.
8
1d. at 437, 85 S.E. at 640.
9 Clark v. Nickell, 73 W. Va. 69, 79 S.E. 1020 (1913).
10 119 W. Va. 467, 194 S.E. 79 (1937).
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as creditor "C. E. Lawhead, receiver." The court held the word
receiver following the creditor's name was unimportant, as it
merely identified the person-descriptio personae. The surety was
held liable for personal deposits made by Lawhead.
SuiRrsmp BY OPmAnoN oF LAw

The opinion in the case of Burlew v. Smith" contains a satisfactory discussion of the respective rights of parties when land
had been sold subject to encumbrances and the vendee assumed
an indebtedness as part of the purchase price. In this case one
Patton conveyed to Smith a parcel of land subject to a vendor's
lien to secure the payment of the purchase price. Smith conveyed
the land to Bowers who assumed the obligation to pay the balance
of the purchase price to Smith. Bowers then sold the land to
Garner, Bowers agreeing to pay the purchase price and to discharge
all liens on the property. There was a default in payment of
the .purchase price to Patton. Burlew, plaintiff in this litigation,
was the administrator of the estate of Patton, the original vendor
in this series of transactions. Garner and Smith filed cross answers
praying for a decree that Bowers pay the indebtedness.
Bowers' express covenant to pay all incumbrances on the land
gave Garner a right to compel her to pay the Patton estate to
Gamer's relief. Bowers' assumption of the Smith notes gave Smith
a like equitable right. In equity, both were quasi sureties of
Bowers. Each, being treated as sureties, could have maintained
a bill in equity to require Bowers to exonerate them. This may be
accomplished by the use of a cross bill.
"[W]hen it is expressly or impliedly agreed that the incumbrance shall be deducted from the consideration, or paid by the
purchaser, the vendor stands in the position of a surety, and is
entitled to exoneration at the expense of the land." It is therefore
the duty of the purchaser of encumbered land who assues or
agrees to pay off the indebtedness of the vendor, as where the
land stands as collateral, to protect the land from sale under the
trust deeds' and the fact that he does not do so, but permits
it to be sold under said deeds, does not exonerate such party from
the payment of the purchase money."2
1168 W. Va. 458, 69 S.E. 908 (1910).
12

Curry v. Hale, 15 W. Va. 867, 874 (1879).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1965

3

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 1 [1965], Art. 3

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6

RELATIONSHIP OF PARTIES ON DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERsHIws

The question of whether two partners who were jointly liable
for an indebtedness to a creditor can change that relationship to
one of principal and surety so as to affect their relation with the
partnership creditor and their attaching responsibilities was answered in Barnes v. Boyers."
Boyers and Harden, doing business under the name of Boyers
and Harden, executed a partnership note payable to Barnes. After
executing the note the partnership was dissolved, and it was agreed
between Boyers and Harden that Harden would pay the note.
At maturity of the note Boyers gave notice to Barnes to proceed
against Harden to collect the note. Harden was alleged to be
solvent at that time, but had since become insolvent. Boyers
defended in part on the basis that he had been discharged from
liability by the creditor's failure to proceed against Harden whom
he claimed as between them was the principal debtor.
The court in finding for the plaintiff concluded that it is not in
the power of joint debtors to change their relations to a common
creditor without his consent, and that the plea did not allege that
the plaintiff was ever consulted or consented to any such arrangement. According to the court, the creditor had a right to ignore
the notice served upon him to forthwith institute action against
the partner who had agreed with the outgoing partner to pay the
partnership indebtedness.
The court noted the case of Johnson v. Young' 4 which had been
cited in support of the contrary view, but stated that the court
went no further in the syllabus than to decide that where one of
two partners purchased the interest of the other in the partnership
property and assumed and agreed to pay the partnership debt, that
as to such debts the former became in equity the principal debtor,
and the latter the surety.
The court in the Barnes case quoted from PARSONS, PARTNE-

srm .428 (3d. ed.):
No dissolution of any kind affects the rights of third parties
who have had dealings with the partnership without their
consent. This is a universal rule, without any exception whatever .... Such an agreement is so far binding on the partners
13

34 W. Va. 303, 12 S.E. 708 (1890).
1.

14 Supra, note
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that, if either of the others is obliged to pay a debt thus assumed by a partner, the partner paying may have his action
for the money against the partner who undertook to pay;
but, so far as the creditors are concerned, all the partners
remain just as responsible for all the creditors after such an
agreement as they were before."
The court noted that it was aware that notwithstanding the
unanimity of the textbooks upon this subject, some very respectable decisions are to be found, both in England and the United
States, which hold otherwise and decide that, where the retiring
partner has brought to the notice of a creditor the fact that
when on dissolution of the partnership one member received all
the assets and had agreed to pay the partnership debts, such
creditor is bound to recognize the newly created relationship of
principal and surety. If the creditor is requested by the retiring
partner to collect his claims from the partner who had agreed to
pay the partnership debts and the creditor refuses or neglects
so to do, if at the time of the request the principal was solvent
and able to pay, even though he thereafter becomes insolvent,
the retiring partner is discharged. 6
When on the dissolution of a co-partnership one partner purchases the interest of his co-partners and agrees to pay all the
partnership liabilities, the partner thus retiring may still be held
liable by the creditors, but if he is compelled to pay he is entitled
to indemnity from the other partner and is therefore as to such
other partner a surety merely upon the partnership obligation.
CoNsmRactoN OF CoNTRrAcr
In determining the liability of a surety on his contract reference
may be had to the language used in the contract as well as to the
attending circumstances. In this regard the Supreme Court of7
Appeals of West Virginia in Waldron v. Tarney Collieries Co.'
stated:
The courts should so far as possible put itself [sic] in the
place of the parties when their minds met upon the terms of
15 Supra, note 13, at 308.
16 See also Colgrove v. Tallman, 67 N. Y. 95 (1876), where the court
held that where one of two co-partners purchased the interest of the other in
the partnership property and assumed and agreed to pay the partnership debts,
as to such debts the former becomes in equity the principal debtor and the
latter a surety; and a firm creditor who has notice of the agreement is bound
to observe it.
17 101 W. Va. 596, 133 S.E. 318 (1926).
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the agreement, and then from a consideration of the writing
itself, or its purpose and of the circumstances which conditioned its making, and endeavor to ascertain what they intended to do, upon what sense and meaning of the terms they
used their minds actually met ....
The intention of the
parties when manifest, must control and be enforced without
regard to inapt expressions and technical rules of interpretation. 8
Generally the same rules of construction and interpretation are
used by the courts with reference to suretyship contracts as in
case of other types of contracts. 9 Although it has been said that
the contract of a compensated surety should be construed most
favorably for the creditor's benefit,2" a surety should have the
right to stand on the very terms of his contract and not be held
responsible beyond the clear and absolute terms of his undertaking.
Presumptions and equities should not be indulged in to enlarge
or in any degree change the surety's obligation from that stated in
his contract." Clearly an uncompensated surety should not be
held beyond the strict terms of the necessary intendment of his
obligation.2
The laws under which bonds are executed are read into them
for the purpose of determining the liability of the surety. 3 The
parties to suretyship arrangements may incorporate by reference
other documents or contracts into a suretyship agreement as in
the case of other types of contracts.'
A gratuitous surety, that is, one who became a surety without
having received value for his undertaking, his obligation being
supported by the same consideration that supports the principal
debtor's obligation, has always been a favorite of the law. 5 He
is not bound beyond the strict terms of the engagement, and his
'189 id. at 599, 133 S.E. at 319.

Id. at 599, 133 S.E. at 319; Schreiber & Sons Co. v. Miller Supply Co.,
77 W. Va. 236, 87 S.E. 353 (1915); Wait v. Homestead Bldg. Assn, supra

note 6.0
' Mills v. Idemnity Ins. Co. of No. America, 114 W. Va. 263, 171 S.E.

532 (1933).
21 Glenn v. Morgan, 23 W. Va. 467 (1884).
22Lawhead v. Doddridge County Bank, supra note 10; Waldron v. Collieries Co., supra note 18; Wait v. Homestead Building Ass'n, supra note 6;

State v. Enslow, 41 W. Va. 744, 24 S.E. 679 (1896).

11 Wait v. Homestead Building Ass'n, supra note 6.
24
5
2

Piedmont Grocery Co. v. Hawkins, 87 W. Va. 38, 104 S.E. 736 (1920).
Board of Comm'rs v. Clemens, 85 W. Va. 11, 100 S.E. 680 (1919).
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liability cannot be extended by implication or construction beyond
the true meaning expressed by the contract.26 Such surety has the
right to insist on standing on the letter of the contract.2 7 He may
plant himself upon the technical objection of non haec in foedera
veni-this is not my contract.2 8
A compensated surety, one who received value for becoming a
surety, such as a surety company, has never been looked upon
with favor by the West Virginia court with respect to such surety's
liability. 29 In some cases a compensated surety has been treated

almost like an insurance company with respect to its liability on
a written contract."0 The contracts of compensated surety companies are usually expressed in terms selected by the surety companies or their lawyers, and therefore terms used should be construed most strongly against the company and in favor of the
obligee named in the contract."
The doctrine or rule of strictissimi juris, strict adherence, applies
for the benefit of a gratuitous surety once the meaning of the
contract has been determined.32 A compensated surety does not
have the benefit of this doctine 3 The rule of strictissimi juris is
not a.rule of construction. It operates only after the meaning
of the contract has been ascertained."
The doctrine of descriptio personae as a rule of construction
applies to suretyship contracts. A bond which ran to "C. E. Lawhead, receiver" was held to protect personal deposits made by
Lawhead. The words following the name merely identified the
person.36
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held it was
proper to permit a corporation to maintain a suit on a bond even
though the bond did not name the corporation as the creditor
Tarney Collieries Co., supra note 17.
Lawhead v. Doddridge County Bank, supra note 22; Glenn v. Morgan,
supra28note 21.
Waldron v. Tarney Collieries Co., supra note 17.
26 Waldron v.
27

29

Mills v. Idemunity Ins. Co. of No. America, supra note 20.

Board of Comm'rs v. Clemens, supra note 25.
at 14, 100 S.E. at 681.
Koblegard Co. v: Maxwell, 127 W. Va. 630, 34 S.E.2d 116 (1945);
Board of Commrs v. Clemens, supra note 25.
33 Board of Comm'rs v. Clemens, supra note 25.
34
Wait v. Homestead Bldg. Ass'n, supra note 6.
11 Schreiber & Sons Co. v. Miller Supply Co., 77 W. Va. 236, 87 S.E. 353
(1915);
Wait v. Homestead Bldg. Ass'n, supra note 6.
3
6 Lawhead v. Doddridge County Bank, supra note 22.
30

3 Id.
32
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where it was shown that the real intent and purpose of the bond
was to protect the corporation. 37
A depositor bond is usually held to be a continuing obligation.
That is, the sureties on such bond continue to be liable for so
long as the principal continues to receive deposits of the obligee
unless the surety takes steps to terminate the continuing offer of
guaranty with respect to subsequent deposits."8
C

rro's DuTY TO VOLUTNEER INFORMATION
TO PROSPECTIVE SUBE=Y

It is recognized that throughout the United States there is a
lack of uniformity on the right of one about to become a surety
to rely upon the silence of the creditor as a representation of the
trustworthiness of the principal obligor. Judge Green in Warren
v. Branch39 disapproved the broad doctrine of Lord Campbell in
Raulton v. Matthews" and adopted the moderate view making
it the duty of the creditor to warn the surety of the unworthiness
of the principal, only when the dealings are such as fairly to lead
a reasonable man to believe fraud must have been used in procurement of the suretyship.
In Wait v. Homestead Bldg. Ass'n4 ' the facts disclose that the
creditor may have had grounds for fear or suspicion, but did not
have actual knowledge of any fact casting reproach upon the honor
of the principal-treasurer of the corporation-creditor. The court observed:
Having no knowledge of any fraud on his part against their
association, the directors could not consistently assume or
suspect any fraud in his transactions with those who became,
or were about to become his sureties. . . . Mere constructive
notice of default is not enough to impose duty to a surety.
Actual knowledge is required.42
The directors of the corporation-creditor are not required to
make an investigation to the end that they might advise the
surety.43
Clark v. Nickell, supra note 9.
Lawhead v. Doddridge County Bank, supra note 22.
'9 15 W. Va. 21 (1879).
40 10 Cl. & F. 934 (H.L. 1844).
37

18

4, Supra, note 6.
42 Id. at 448, 449,

85 S.E. at 644, 645.

43 Id. at 449, 85 S.E. at 645.
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The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has cited with
apparent approval the Georgia case of Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Gate
City Nat'l Bank44 with respect to any duty on the part of the
creditor to inform a surety of misconduct on the part of the
principal debtor. In the Georgia case, the contract in issue provided that the creditor-bank was to notify the surety of any loss
of more than a prescribed amount. The court said:
"
Only after knowledge had actually come to the Bank that
he was, or had become, otherwise, was it under any duty to
the company; and then, it was required to immediately notify
the company of what it had ascertained .... The 'knowledge'
referred to meant actual knowledge."
The highest court in West Virginia has noted that the United
States Supreme Court has denied any duty on the part of an
employee to exercise diligence to ascertain whether an employer
defaulted or did any act indicative of untrustworthiness, to the
extent that the sureties may be protected, and repudiated the view
that the doctrine of constructive notice applies to the subject.4 6
What is meant by "immediate notice" when the creditor by the
terms of the contract agreed to give "immediate notice" upon
discovering a default by the principal has been considered by
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. The court said that
"immediate notice" does not require literal interpretation. "As
soon as reasonably practical under the circumstances," "without
unreasonable and unnecessary delay," "within a reasonable time,"
or "with reasonable diligence" are considered equivalent terms. 47
Perhaps the fullest consideration of the obligation of the creditor
to volunteer information to the surety is found in the old case of
Warren v. Branch 5 where the court said:
What misrepresentations or failures to disclose facts and
circumstances by a creditor will release a security from his
obligation to pay a debt? When with the knowledge and assent
of the creditor, there is a misrepresentation with regard to a
material fact, which, had it been known, might reasonably
44 97 Ga. 634, 25 S.E. 392 (1896).
4
1 Wait v. Homestead Bldg. Ass'n,
46
4 7

48

Id. at 447, 85 S.E. at 644.

supra note 6, at 446, 85 S.E. at 644.

Piedmont Grocery Co. v. Hawkins, supra note 24.

15 W. Va. 21 (1879).
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have prevented the security from entering into his contract
of suretyship, such contract will not be binding on the surety,
though such misrepresentation was not made with a fraudulent purpose.49
Unless the surety makes an inquiry of the creditor, the creditor
is under no duty to disclose facts to the surety which are in no
mainer connected with the transaction which is the subject of
the suretyship, even though such facts would likely influence the
surety to enter into, or decline to enter into the particular contract."a For example, a creditor is under no duty to volunteer
information to one about to become a surety that the principal
debtor is a gambler. Such fact not being connected with the
proposed transaction, the creditor would be under no duty to
volunteer a disclosure of this fact to the surety.
A creditor who knows that the principal debtor is insolvent need
not inform the surety of this fact when no inquiry is made of
him with respect to this matter. The Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia said by the way of dicta:
It is a material fact connected with the contract of suretyship, which might influence the surety in entering into the
contract, if fraudulently concealed with a view to benefit
the creditor, such concealment, though no inquiry has been
made by the surety, would vitiate the contract of suretyship
and discharge the surety.5 '
Where there is a secret agreement between the creditor and the
principal that the whole or substantial part of the money borrowed
is to be applied to a pre-existing debt due the creditor, and this
fact is not disclosed to the surety, the creditor believing that if
the surety had such knowledge the surety would not sign the bond,
such concealment, considered with the motive involved, would
amount to fraud on the surety and would vitiate his contract. On
the other hand, if the creditor had no reason to believe that the
surety would not sign such a bond if he knew of the facts, the
failure to communicate this fact would not be fraudulent, and
the surety would be liable on the contract, assuming of course that
the surety had made no inquiry with respect to the matter.5 2
49
50 Id. at 26-27.

Id.at 35.
slId. at 35.

52

Id. at 35.
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Where a bond is given for a cashier which binds the surety for
all defalcations of the cashier, both past and future, the creditor
would be guilty of fraud upon the surety if the fact that the
creditor was already in default at the time of surety's undertaking
was not disclosed to the surety, even though no inquiry was made.
This is true even though there was no direct dealing between the
creditor and the surety as where the cashier-principal debtor
sought out the surety to sign the bond. 3
Generally speaking, if the principal, in procuring one to become
his surety committed a fraud upon the surety, either in suppressing
or misstating facts, and the 'creditor had no knowledge and gave
no assent to the fraud, the surety would nevertheless be liable
4
to the creditor.1
In instances where the principal debtor practiced fraud upon
one to induce that person to become a surety either by suppressing
material facts, or by misstating facts and dealings such as to
fairly lead the creditor, if a reasonable man, to believe that the
principal must have been guilty of fraud in order to induce the
surety to enter into the contract, the creditor is bound to inquire
of the surety how his execution of the contract had in fact been
procured. The creditor's failure to make such inquiry, if fraud
had in fact been practiced by the principal on the surety, entitled
the surety to avoid liability because of the fraud even though no
fraud was traced to the creditor." As the court said:
If he has abstained from inquiry in such a case, because
he sees the result of the inquiry would probably be shown
that the transaction, in which he was engaging, was tainted
with fraud, his want of knowledge of the fraud would in such
56
a case afford no excuse.
APPicABmnr= OF SuriRYsrma

LAw To NEGOTABLE INSTRUMENTs

Careful consideration should be given to the laws to be applied
in determining the rights and liabilities of those who have loaned
their credit to another as evidenced by a negotiable instrument.
The issue is whether the courts should apply negotiable instruments laws or rules of suretyship law in determining the rights
and liabilities of one who is a surety on a negotiable instrument.
53

Id. at 35.
36.
5s Id. at 36.
54 Id. at

-6 Id. at 36.
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When one, other than the owner of a negotiable instrument,
places his signature on a negotiable instrument for the purpose
of adding his credit to the obligation of another, such party
becomes in the broad sense a surety, whether he placed his name
on the instrument as co-maker or endorser.
In a case"' decided after the adoption of the Uniform Negotiable
Instrument Act, but prior to the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
resolved that it had not been the intent of the West Virginia
legislature when it enacted the Uniform Negotiable Instruments
Law to take from the operation of the Negotiable Instruments Law
the entire body of laws relating to suretyship transactions. The
court said: "... [I]n our opinion [the statute] evidence [sic] a
clear legislative intent to make the relation of principal and surety
as it existed at common law applicable to negotiable instruments.","
Prior to its repeal by the adoption of the Uniform Commercial
Code, section 2, article 8, chapter 46 of the West Virginia Code
(Michie 1961) provided for the discharge of negotiable instruments. Subsection (d) thereof provided: "This section does not
include the rules governing the discharge of a surety or a party
secondarily liable because of such secondary liability." The court
felt obliged to disapprove a portion of its opinion in the previous
case of Marshall County Bank v. Fonner.9 In the Marshall County
Bank case there was no qualification to the signatures of the
alleged accommodation makers. It did appear that the plaintiff
.knew that two of the parties had signed the instrument as accommodation makers. In the later case the court said: "We disapprove
such parts of that opinion as would indicate that the law of
suretyship where the relation of principal and surety is shown
under proper evidence does not apply to negotiable instruments.""0
As to whether such surety should be discharged in toto or pro
tanto should be resolved according to the applicable principles
of suretyship law.
Section 3415 of the UNnORM COMMERCIAL CODE entitled "Contract of Accommodation Party" sets forth the law to be applied

- Koblegard Co. v. Maxwell, supra note 32.
53

Id. at 638, 34 S.E. at 120.
W. Va. 451, 168 S.E. 375 (1933).
oKoblegard Co.v. Maxwell, supra note 32, at 639, 34 S.E.2d at 120.

5'113
6
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in determining the rights and liabilities of accommodation parties
to negotiable instruments under the Uniform Commercial Code
as now in effect in West Virginia. By this section of the Code
it would seem that every person who places his name on a
negotiable instrument, whether as an endorser or as co-maker,
for the purpose of lending his name to another party is an accommodation party, -whether the person so lending his name was or
was not compensated for so doing.
Under sub-section (3) of section 3-415 of the UNFomi
MERCIAL CODE

Com-

the fact that one whose signature appears on a

negotiable instrument was in fact a surety-accommodation party
may not be shown against a holder in due course of the instrument who purchased the instrument without knowledge of the
accommodation character of the signature. That is, parol evidence
may not be introduced by the accommodation party against a
holder in due course who purchased without knowledge of the
accommodation character of a party to show the suretyship relation in order that he might benefit by any discharge dependent
on his character as such. A surety co-maker on a negotiable instrument may prove any defense against a party not a holder in due
course, or against a holder in due course who had knowledge of
the accommodation character of the signature at the time of purchase, which he might have asserted against the party had the
instrument been non-negotiable. For example, he might have shown
that a binding extension of time for payment had been granted
to the principal debtor without his consent. In which case under
the rules applicable to suretyship law the surety would have
a defense to any claim by the creditor, assuming the surety had
not consented to the extension.
An accommodation endorser, as any other unqualified endorser,
is only liable as an endorser after the instrument has been properly
presented, dishonored and proper notice of dishonor given. It
should be noted in passing that under the Uniform Commercial
Code an accommodation endorser is only liable on his contract of
endorsement and is not liable as a warrantor.
As to whether the surety should be discharged either in toto or
pro tanto, the court resolved that this issue should be determined
by the application of the law of suretyship.
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PAN V. PACKARD

The doctrine of the case of Painv. Packard" is in force in West
Virginia by virtue of a statute62 which may be traced to a Virginia
statute enacted in 1794, twenty years before the decision by the
New York court in the case of Pain v. Packard.
The court in the Packard case was called upon to determine
whether the creditor continued to have a cause of action against
the surety after having failed to proceed against the principal
debtor in accordance with the surety's request. The court found
for the surety and denied the creditor's claim against the surety.
The WEST VmnGnzrr CoDE ch. 45, art. 1, § 1 (Michie 1961) confers on the surety the right to demand that the creditor proceed
against the principal debtor or lose his rights against the surety.
The statute is designed to afford protection to the surety when a
creditor is careless in failing to recover from the principal debtor;
otherwise the creditor might delay his effort to recover until the
insolvency of the principal debtor which would place the surety
in the position of having to bear the ultimate loss. In the absence
of a statute,63 and except for a few states, the only remedy available to the surety at maturity of the debt, and prior to payment
of the debt, is by the equity bill quia timet." That is, the surety
at maturity of the debt, may file a bill in equity to obtain a decree
against the principal debtor ordering the principal debtor to pay
the creditor the gilm due in order to save the surety harmless.6"
The statute affords the surety additional protection by authorizing him to require the creditor to sue every party to the contract
who is a resident of the state and not insolvent or lose his rights
against all sureties on the contract.66
As the object of the statute is to provide a practical working
device by which the ordinary citizen-surety may avail himself in
a summary way of the relief offered to him by the expensive and
circuitous procedure of a bill quia timet, the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia has expressed the view that courts should
61

13 Johns. Gas. 174 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jud. 1815).

W . VA. CODE ch. 45, art. 1, §§
63 First Nat1 Bank v. Kittle, 69 W.

62

6

-1Williams

65

Id.

1, 2 (Michie 1981).
Va. 171, 71 S.E. 109 (1911).
v. Zimmerman, 124 W. Va. 458, 20 S.E.2d 785 (1942).

at 464, 20 S.E.2d at 787; Neal v. Buffington, 42 W. Va. 327, 26

S.E. 1.72 (1896); Knight v. Charter, 22 W. Va. 422 (1883); Mattingly v.
Sutton,
6 19 W. Va. 19 (1881).
" Remage v. Marple, 76 W. Va. 379, 85 S.E. 663 (1915).
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not require of a surety the use of precise and technical exactness
in giving notice to the creditor that would be required in pleadings
and like instruments. Substantial conformity is all that appears to
7
be required.1
The statute clearly requires that the notice from the surety to
the creditor to forthwith to institute suit be in writing. It has
been held that a notice which provided in part "this is to notify
you to collect"' was not equivalent to the statutory requirement
for the surety to notify the creditor to "forthwith to institute suit."69
However, the demand to "sue at once" satisfies the requirement
of the statute. The notice served upon the attorney for the holder
of the note in question was held to be an insufficient demand by

the surety."°
A creditor, in order
the absence of statute,
to collect an obligation
merely remains passive

to preserve his rights against a surety, in
is not bound to active diligence in trying
from the principal debtor." If the creditor
his rights are not impaired.72

The Code provision adopting into law the doctrine of Pain v.
Packardante-dates the adoption of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act 3 and the Uniform Commercial Code and is not impliedly repealed by either of these acts with respect to rights of
any indorser-surety on a negotiable instrument.
On at least three occasions the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia has been called upon to determine whether the
burden of proof is upon the surety to show as part of his defense,
when sued by the creditor, that the principal debtor was solvent
and a resident of the state or whether the creditor has the burden,
as part of his case, of proving when he sued the surety, after
having received the demand to forthwith institute suit that the
creditor was a non-resident or insolvent at the time the demand
was made and for a reasonable time thereafter.7 4
67
Williams v. Zimmerman, supra note 64; McDonald v. Stewart, 110
NV. Va.
6 8 280,158 S.E. 177 (1931).
Williams v. Zimmerman, supra note 64.
69
Williams v. Zimmerman, supra note 64.
70
Kisn v. Messenger, 126 W. Va. 60, 27 S.E.2d 265 (1943).
71 First Nat1 Bank v. Kittle, supra note 63.
7'
Renick v. Ludington, 14 W. Va. 267 (1878).
73
W. VA. CODE ch. 46, art. 8, § 2 (Michie 1961). "This section does
not include
the rules governing the discharge of a surety.
..
7
1 McDonald v. Stewart, 110 W. Va. 280, 158 S.E. 177 (1931); Barnes v.
Boyers, 34 W. Va. 303, 12 S.E. 708 (1890); Gililan v. Ludington, 6 W. Va.
128 (1873).
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The earliest case in which the court considered this question
was the case of Gillilan v. Ludington" where the court held that
the burden was upon the creditor to show why the surety should
not be released. The court stated:
The plea before us sets out that the defendant, the surety,
has done what the 1st section of the statute required him to do,
and all that it required him to do; it omits to state, beyond
reciting the fact that the plaintiff had failed to institute suit
in a reasonable time, and the legal consequence which followed, the further particulars connected with the suit, as
mentioned in the second section. But these matters are made
by statute the duty of the creditor and are supposed to be
particularly within his own knowledge .... These are matters
more likely to be known to him than to the surety; and if
on :receiving the notice he has complied with these requirements of the statute, he can readily reply then by way of
avoidance to the plea.
Some years after the decision in the Gillilan case the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia in Barnes v. Boyers, 6 by the
way of dicta, recognized that the plea of the surety under sections
one and two should aver the solvency of the principal at the time
suit should have been instituted and that he then resided in the
state.
Finally, in McDonald v. Stewart"' the Supreme Court =1f Appeals
of West Virginia reversed the position it had taken -n the Gillilan
case. The court stated:
1f the principal debtor is not solvent and resident within
the state, the surety has no right to require the creditor to sue.
In such situation the complaining surety must rely upon contribution among thae sureties for partial relief from the burden
of the debt, when that burden shall have been discharged.78
In arriving at its conclusion the court found an analogy between
a bill quia timet and the statute. If the surety had sued out a
bill quia timet, the surety would have had the burden of making
his case. 9 As the statute was designed to make unnecessary the
7-

Supra, note 74.

71, Supra, note 74.
77
71
71,

Supra, note 74.
Id. at 284, 158 S.E. at 179; see also Barnes v. Boyers, supra note 74.
McDonald v. Stewart, supra note 74, at 286, 158 S.E. at 177.
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use of a bill quia timet, the burden of proving the solvency and
residency of the debtor remains on the surety. The court summarized its position by stating:
Therefore, a surety or endorser who undertakes to avail
himself of the provisions of Code 45-1-1 and 2, and seeks to
set up such matters as a defense to an action against him by
the creditor, must aver his special plea and prove not only
that he gave the notice prescribed by the statute and that the
creditor failed to sue within a reasonable time, but also that
at the time of the giving of the notice and for a reasonable
time thereafter, the principal, was solvent and resident within
the state.8"
The court found for the plaintiff-creditor because the endorsersurety failed to prove the solvency of the principal debtor.
The doctrine of Pain v. Packard is by statute, W. VA. CODE ch.
45, art 1, § 1 (Michie 1961) made applicable to endorsers.'
JOEI-ER OF PARTEs

In one of the most lengthy, if not the most lengthy, opinions
delivered by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
involving the laws of suretyship the court was concerned with the
proper joinder of parties.2 The court could cite no authority
which required the creditor of joint judgment debtors separately
owning real estate on which the judgment constituted a lien to
prosecute a single judgment lien suit against the lands of both or
all the debtors or separate suits contemporaneously against them
for enforcement of the lien. With respect to authorities cited by
the appellant the court said:
They say all of the co-debtors must be made parties to a
suit to enforce the lien against the land of one of them, because
they are parties to the judgment, liable for it and have right to
insist upon its proper rank and priority in the adjustment of
the liens. Shenandoah etc. Bank v. Bates, 20 W. Va. 210*Norris Coldwell & Co. v. Bean, 17 W. Va. 655; Neely v. Jones,
16 W. Va. 625; Jackson v. Hull, 21 W. Va. 601. None of them
83
intimate necessity of bringing co-debtors' land into the suit.
The court continued by stating: '
80

McDonald v. Stewart, supra note 74, at 288, 158 S.E. at 180.

81 Shields v. Reynolds, 9 W. Va. 483 (1876).
82
83

First Natl Bank v. McGraw, 85 W. Va. 298, 101 S.E. 474 (1919).
Id. at 314, 101 S.E. at 480.
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Ihae lien and the land on which it subsists constitutes the
basis of the cause of action. The creditor is not necessarily
concerned about the equities between his debtors. He is entitled to his money and cannot be rightfully subjected to
undue delay, trouble or expense by their equities. They have
their own remedies therefor [sic]. The situation is not the
same as that of right to a mere personal decree against parties
jointly liable in equity. Nor is it the same as the case in
which the joint debtors or principal and surety and their
respective properties happen, by some means, to be all in
court and subject to its jurisdiction at the same time, in the
same or different suits, and their rights so far ascertained
that the equities can be enforced between the debtor without
substantial detriment to the creditor.84
A surety may proceed against the principal debtor to compel
him to pay by way of exoneration and if he gets all the parties
and all the property into the court at the same time, he may have
his equities awarded to him by a proper decree."
In a suit in which the issue of joinder parties was raised, the
facts disclosed that one McNeer, the cashier of the Bank of Union,
executed a bond which named as obligees the president and four
directors of the bank with three of these directors as his sureties.
The principal and the surety died before suit. The bill did not
name their personal representatives. The court stated that equity
had jurisdiction to enforce payment of a lost instrument.86 The
procedure in equity for suing on a lost instrument is more flexible
and affords greater freedom." Resort to equity is frequently,
though not always, permitted to establish and enforce payment
of a lost instrument.8". The subsequent production of a lost obligation will not operate to defeat jurisdiction, when once properly
assumed. 9 However, the West Virginia court has stated that all
the surviving obligors, and the representatives of those who are
dead, should be named as parties to the suit, unless their absence
be excused by reason of insolvency or other substantial cause. As
8

1Ibid.

8- First Natl Bank v. McGraw, supra note 82.

I Clark v. Nickell, 73 W. Va. 69, 79 S.E. 1020 (1913); Yates v. Stuart,
39 W. Va. 124, 19 S.E. 423 (1894); Hall v. Wilkinson, 35 W. Va. 167, 12
S.E. 1118 (1891); Lyttle v. Cozad, 21 W. Va. 183 (1882).
8 Clark v. Nickell, supranote 86.
Clark v. Nickell, supra note 86.
8. Lyttle v. Cozad, supra note 86.
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authority for this proposition, the court in quoting from White v.
Kennedy said:
'In a creditor's bill against the administrator and heirs of a
decedent to enforce the collection of a debt secured to the
plaintiff by the joint and several obligation of the decedent
and another obligor, such obligor is a necessary party to such
bill, although he may be a non-resident,' because he has a
right to appear and make defense to such bill, and the administrator and heirs of such decedent have the right to
require him to make a party to the suit, [sic] so that in case
he should appear his liability for such debt may be ascertained
and determined between him and such- decedent.9 '
The court stated in summarizing its position that:
[I]t is necessary to name as parties all persons living, and
the personal representatives of those who are dead, whose
interests are to be affected by the final determination of
the cause, to the end that all matters may be adjusted and
complete justice done in one suit. Otherwise, if a liability
is fixed as to one or more and not all of the several obligors,
those required to discharge and who do discharge the liability
are obliged to seek by other litigation contribution from those
jointly liable with them. And the fact that some are dead,
does not in equity, excuse failure to join the personal representative with those still living, although at law such joinder
is not allowed. Where a creditor applies to a court of equity
for its aid in the collection of his debt against sureties, the
simple allegation of the death of the principal debtor or a
co-surety and his insolvency will not excuse the omission to
make his representative a party to the bill, unless it appears
that no part of the debt would be made out of his estate ....
The principal if living, and his estate thereafter, by the
very nature of the undertaking, assumes the chief burden of
payment. While a judgment obtained in an action at law
against all the obligors when sued jointly, as they may be,
is enforceable against any one of them, it enures to the benefit
of the one so discharging the obligation, who may enforce it
by any proper porcess or proceeding against the principal or
90

23 W. Va. 221 (1883).
9' Clark v. Nickell, supra note 86, at 75, 29 S.E. at 1023.
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his estate, or ratably against the co-sureties. If at the date
of the action or during its pendency the principal or any
surety dies, separate actions against the survivors and the
personal representatives of the deceased obligors may proceed
to final judgment in both. But in equity, by reason of its
flexible rules and procedure, all may with propriety be joined
in the same suit, and should be joined, unless completely insolvent at the time; and to excuse the omission even for this
cause, there must be averment and proof of insolvency, unless
admitted by defendants.92
The court reversed the lower court and held that the demurrer
should have been sustained.
The issue of joining a surety and principal debtor and guarantor
and principal debtor in the same court was considered in Shore
v. Lawrence." The facts in this case disclosed that the defendant
had agreed that in case of failure of the tenant to pay the rental
in accordance with the terms of a rental agreement the defendant
would pay the same. The defendant was not a party to the lease;
his agreement to pay was collateral and conditional. That is, his
agreement was to pay in case the lessee did not. The court said
this made the defendant a guarantor and not a surety. As the
contracts of the defendant and the lessee were separate and distinct and not joint, the court held that they could not be joined as
defendants, in respect to the liability imposed in the lease.
A surety on executing a bond, becomes responsible for the
fidelity of the principal. Such a bond is not a collateral engagement dependent on some contingency or condition different from
the engagement of the principal. They are joint obligors with the
same conditions underwritten. 4
L[CK OF CAPACrrY OF PRINCIPAL DEBTOR TO CONTRACr

Generally speaking a valid contract with the principal debtor is
essential to the validity of a contract of suretyship. This is true in
situations prohibited by law or where the obligation of the principal
debtor was induced by the fraud practiced by the creditor on
the principal debtor.95
92

Ibid.

93 68
94

W. Va. 220, 69 S.E. 791 (1910).
Wait v. Homestead Bldg. Ass'n, 76 W. Va. 431, 85 S.E. 637 (1915).
9-Boyard v. Boyard, 79 W. Va. 554, 91 S.E. 529 (1917).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol68/iss1/3

20

Morris: Suretyship Law in West Virginia

1965]

SURETYSHIP LAW IN WEST VIRGINIA

23

However, the incapacity of the principal debtor to contract
does not have the effect of invalidating the contract of the surety
on such principal's contract." The insanity of the principal debtor
at thb time of entering into the agreement does not relieve the
surety of liability on the contract.9"
In Burner v. Nutter9 8 the court by way of dicta indicated that a
surety who pledged his credit to the fulfillment of a contract of
a person under some disability to contract, such an in infant or
other person non sui juris, is liable, notwithstanding the principal's
disability, except obligations procured by fraud.
AMOUNT OF DAMAGES ON PERFomvANcE BOND

With respect to the amount of damages which recipient of a
performance bond may recover from a surety on the bond, the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has held that the
creditor on the bond should be limited in his recovery to the
profit he would have made on the contract provided the principal
obligor had carried out his agreement to the letter. The court
recognized that in special, undefined cases departure from the
strictness of this rule might be permitted.99
PuBLIc OFFiCLuS' BoNDs

The purpose of bonds for public officials is to guarantee the,
good conduct of the officers in general. Such bonds are payable
to the state. Any person injured by the wrongful act of the public
officer in the performance of the officer's official duty may sue
on the bond in the name of the state. '
It seems to be very generally held that an official bond containing only the usual conditions requiring the faithful performance of the duties of the office, and an accounting for
moneys coming into the hands of the officer, does not cover
penalties, forfeitures and other emercements super-imposed
upon the officer over and above the damages resulting from
his wrong, unless especially so provided by statute."'
Id. at 558, 91 S.E. at 530.
v. Nutter, 77 W. Va. 256, 87 S.E. 359 (1915).
1Id. at 258, 87 S.E. at 360.
"100Horn v. Bowen, 136 W. Va. 465, 67 S.E.2d 737 (1951).
Lammon v. Feusier, 111 U.S. 17 (1884); Wait v. Homestead Bldg.
Ass'n, supra note 94.
101 State ex rel. Sabatino v. Richards, 127 W. Va. 703, 34 S.E.2d 271
(1945).
96

97
Burner
9
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This is evidenced by fact that the legislature deemed it necessary
to enact into law the provisions of WEST VmGINI CODE ch. 38, art.
8, § 8 (Michie 1961), which confer on the complaining party
a cause of action against both the officer and the surety.
STATUTORY PENALTY

In a case' °2 involving a statutory penalty the court was concerned
with a claim against a constable and his surety on the constable's
official bond. The plaintiff sought to recover the sum of $5.00
for each day that the plaintiff's exempted wages remained unreleased from execution as provided in WEST VniGINA CODE ch. 38,
art. 8, § 8 (Michie 1961). The statute expressly provides that
recovery may be had against either the principal or the surety.
The court recognized that one's action to recover a statutory
penalty,
unless otherwise provided for by statute, is non-assign03
able.'
If the party having the cause of action cannot by contract make
an assignment
of the cause of action then it will not survive his
04
death.'
As the cause of action is non-assignable and would not survive
the plaintiff's death, the plaintiff's cause of action would be barred
by the one year statute of limitations under subparagraph (c) of
WEST Vm NA CODE' ° and is not governed by the ten year statute
of limitations applicable to actions on official bonds. The court in
the Richards case held the one year statute of limitations applied
to the action against both the constable and his surety.
SURETY ON BAIm BOND
The rights of a surety on a recognizance was in issue in Carr
v. Davis.'°6 Carr, a surety on a recognizance, took from a felon
and others a bond to indemnify Carr against loss on the recognizState ex rel. Sabatino v. Richards, supranote 101.
Id. at 707, 34 S.E.2d at 273; see also Western Mortgage & Guar. Co. v.
Gray 215 Cal. 191, 8 P.2d 1016 (1932); Wilson v. Shrader, 73 W. Va. 105,
79 S.E. 1083 (1913).
304 State ex rel. Sabatino v. Richards, supra note 101.
102

103

105

"Every

personal action for which no limitation is otherwise prescribed

shall be brought: . . . (c) within one year after the right to bring the same
shall have accrued if it be for any other matter of such nature that, in case
a party died, it could not have been brought at common law by or against
his personal representative." W. VA. CODE ch. 55, art. 2, § 12 (Michie 1961).
°6 64 W. Va. 522, 63 S.E. 326 (1908).
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ance. The court stated that it seems settled that when a bail pays
a recognizance the law does not imply a promise by the accused
to reimburse the bail. According to the court, it is also settled
"that though a criminal recognizance is a lien for the state on
land, yet the bail surety cannot be substituted to the lien, and
this for like reasons against raising an implied promise or repayment to the bail." 7 There appear to be no cases holding that a
contract by a third party to indemnify a surety upon a recognizance
is illegal." 8 The court refused to adopt the position that a person
accused of a crime could not enter into a valid express contract
to indemnify his surety against loss on a recognizance."'
ExTENsioN OF

Tnvm

In West Virginia, as in many other states, the effect of a binding
extension of the due date entered into between the principal debtor
and the creditor depends on whether the surety is a gratuitous11
or a compensated surety.1"
It is settled that mere indulgence granted to the principal debtor
by the creditor will not release the surety of liability. When the
creditor is indulgent and merely neglects to enforce payment,
and if the principal debtor becomes insolvent, the surety for that
reason alone cannot complain for the indulgence by the creditor
2
was likewise shown the surety.1
If without the consent of the gratuitous surety the creditor makes
an obligatory agreement with the principal debtor by which the
time of payment is extended to him so as to tie the hands of the
creditor from proceeding in the interval to enforce the original
contract, the remedies of the surety against the principal are for
the same period suspended which exposes the surety to a hazard
and risk of loss not contemplated by his undertaking. While in
Knight v. Charter' the court found no binding extension had been
granted, it did recognize that if there had been a binding extension,
the extension would have been enough to absolve the surety of
liability without inquiring into the question of whether the surety
suffered any loss by the extension.
107

Id. at 524, 63 S.E. at 327.

100 98 Id. at 522, 63 S.E. at 326.
'
Id. at 522, 63 S.E. at 326.

" 0 Glenn v. Morgan, 23 W. Va. 467 (1884).
"'. Board of Comm'rs v. Clemens, 85 W. Va. 11, 100 S.E. 680 (1919).
112 Knight v. Charter, 22 W. Va. 422 (1883).
113 Id. at 429.
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A surety company which has received value for being a surety
is not released from liability because of a binding extension of
time granted by the creditor to the principal debtor unless: (1) the
extension exceeds the time limited in the bonds for bringing an
action thereon or (2) the surety company thereby is made to suffer
a material harm."' In this case the question is raised as to whether
the surety company should be released in toto or only to the
extent of any damages which the surety company suffered as a
result of the extension. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia considered this matter in McKenzie v. Wiley, ' and indicated that in some instances the discharge of the surety would be
in toto while in others it would be pro tanto. While the court
did not specify under what circumstances the discharge would
be in toto or pro tanto, perhaps the court would apply one rule
in case of a compensated surety and the other in case of a gratuitous
surety.
In order for an extension of time to constitute a binding extension the extension must be a contractual extension. 1 6 That is, the
extension of time granted to the principal debtor by the creditor
must have been for a definite period and supported by valuable
consideration. The paying of interest already due is not sufficient to
satisfy the requirement of consideration to amount to a contractual
extension"1 7 because the principal debtor did nothing that he was
not already obligated to do. The actual advance payment of
usurious interest by the principal debtor to the creditor, where the
whole interest so paid cannot be recovered, is sufficient consideration for an agreement to extend the time of payment and to
release the surety."1 8 The payment of interest in advance for a
definite period implies a contract to extend the due date for
payment for that period and such extension amounts to contractual
extension of the due date. '19
The right of a surety to be discharged because of the creditor
having entered into a contractual extension of time with the principal debtor is a personal privilege which the surety may waive,
114 Board of Comm'rs v. Clemens, supra note 111.
I's 27 W. Va. 658 (1886).

116 Koblegard Co. v. Maxwell, 127 W. Va. 630, 34 S.E.2d 116 (1945);
McKenzie v. Wiley, supra note 115; Glenn v. Morgan, supra note 110;
Knight v. Charter, supranote 112.
117 Knight v. Charter, supranote 112.
118 Glenn v. Morgan, supra note 110.
19 Id. at 469,470.
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and if the surety does so, with full knowledge of the facts by
renewing his promise to be bound after his discharge, the surety
may be estopped from afterwards availing himself of such discharge. For this to occur the promise to remain bound must be
clear and explicit, such as will show that he intended to waive
his privilege and to remain bound notwithstanding his right to be
discharged. 20 It is equally clear that a surety upon learning that
an extension of time has been granted to the principal debtor by
the creditor is not estopped to assert his release by virtue of the
extension of time by the fact that he did not express his objection
to the extension upon learning of the extension. '
An attorney at law, in the absence of express authority given
him by the creditor, has no authority to extend the due date for
payment. The unauthorized extension of the due date granted by
the creditor's attorney, not being a binding extension of time, does
'
not release the surety of liability. 22
It is recognized that under early West Virginia decisions binding
extensions of time granted to the principal debtor on a bond did
not release the surety at law but only in equity.'23 Today there is
no reason to make such a distinction.
REwAL. NoTs

Consideration will now be given to the issue of whether the acceptance by the creditor of a renewal note which is not signed
by the party who was surety on the original note relieves such
surety of liability.
"There are decisions to the effect, that if commercial paper, as
a bill or negotiable note, payable at a future time be taken for
an existing debt, the law implies from this transaction an agreement to wait till the bill or note matures," before the creditor seeks
to collect, and such transaction will therefore discharge the sureties
from liability if the sureties did not consent to such an arrangement.'24
[T]here are many cases in which it . . . [has been] held
that the taking of . . . [a] bill or note is only prima facie evi-

dence that it was taken as collateral payment, and therefore
that existing right of action on the original debt was suspended,
120
121
122
123

Id. at 471.
Id. at 471, 472.

Board of Comm'rs v. Clemens, supra note 111.
Glenn v. Morgan, supra note 110; Sayre v. King, 17 W. Va. 562 (1880).
, Sayre v. King, supra note 123, at 573.
24
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and that it may be proven, that it was not so taken, but was
taken as collateral security in which case the right of action
on the original debt will not be suspended,
'
and the surety on the original obligation will remain liable. 25
Tle idea that the giving of a bill or note is prima facie conditional payment which operates to suspend the debt has its
origin in the commercial law rather than in the common law. 26
Where a single non-negotiable bill or a bond or mortgage or an
assignment of chattels to be delivered at a future date has been
taken for an antecedent debt, there should be no legal implications of an agreement to forbear the collection of the antecedent
debt; unless such agreement is otherwise proved than by the mere
proof of the taking of such single bill or other chose in action not
commercial paper, the sureties on the original debt are not dis1 27
charged.
Where the creditor receives from the principal debtor his
negotiable bill or note for an existing debt, this is prima facie
conditional payment of the original debt. However, "it may be
shown by direct or circumstantial evidence, that the [negotiable]
bill or ... note was taken as ... absolute payment or as collateral
security ....

"128

It may be said as general propositions that where a "chose in
action, such as a . .. [non]negotiable note ... a deed of trust or
mortgage or an obligation to deliver goods be given by the debtor
to his creditor, such chose . . . is prima facie collateral security
for the original debt." If the chose in action was received by the
creditor as absolute payment of the antecedent debt, it discharges
the surety of liability. On the other hand, if the chose in action is
"received as conditional payment, and such chose in action is
payable at a future time, it amounts to a suspension of the . . .
[creditor's right] to sue on his original debt; and if taken," by the
creditor without the consent of the surety, the surety is released of
' At this juncture one may question whether the surety
liability. 29
is no longer liable because the obligation on which he was a
surety in fact has been paid or whether he is released because
there has been a contractual extension of the due date. This may
Id. at 575.
Id. at 562.
,1,7Id. at 575.
125
126

128

129

Id. at 574.
Id. at 575.
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be important where the surety in question is a surety company
which received value for the undertaking. An examination of the
portion of this paper dealing with extension of the due date will
disclose that the compensated surety is not released under the same
circumstances as voluntary surety. 13 If the chose in action was
received by the creditor merely as additional security for the
debt, though the chose be payable at a future date, and unless
there was an agreement to postpone the right to sue on the original
debt, proved either by direct or circumstantial evidence, the taking
of the collateral security would not suspend the creditor's right of
action on the original debt; therefore, under such circumstances
the surety is not released."'
In the case of Hess v. Dille, 3' George C. Shafer incumbered
his property to secure his debt to Chesney. Subsequently Shafer
conveyed the property to M.V.C. Brbokover who agreed to pay
Shafer's obligation to Chesney, the grantor retaining a vendor's
lien as security. By this transaction the grantee, M.V.C. Brookover,
became responsible to Chesney for the debt, and the land was
specifically and expressly charged with payment resulting in a
suretyship relation. Subsequently, M.V.C. Brookover sold the property to M. E. Brookover who assumed the obligation to Chesney
and was given credit on the purchase price for the amount due
Chesney. At the maturity of Shafer's note M. E. Brookover gave
her note to Chesney for the balance due Chesney and obtained
from Chesnev the 'Shafter note. The court resolved that by this
transaction the parties intended to release M.V.C. Brookover from
his liability. The issue to be determined was whether the land
remained subject to a lien. The court said:
[I]t is well settled both in Virginia and this State, that the
giving of a new note for a previous one which had become due,
is not to be regarded as an absolute extinguishment or payment
of the precedent note or pre-existing debt, unless it was so
expressly agreed whether the new note was that of one previously bound or of a stranger . . .. Where the new note is
that of a third person, the surrender of the old note will be
held to . . . prima facie discharge . . . the old note and . . .
[to release the maker of the old note from liability. However,
130

Board of Conm'rs v. Clemens, supra note 111.

'"'

Hess v. Dille, 23 W. Va. 90 (1883).

132

Ibid.
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where] the holder of the old note had a specific lien on land
as security for the debt and by an arrangement between the
maker of the old and the maker of the new note, the.., land
becomes the property of the latter, who at the same time ...
[assumes the] debt as a part of the consideration for the land,
the execution of .. .[the] new note for ... [the debt does
not extinguish the debt unless it is so agreed.]"'
It is clear that under the facts of this case the new note was not
in fact one of a third party or stranger but was the note of a party
already bound for the debt. The court concluded that when M. E.
Brookover gave her note to Chesney and received the Shafer note,
it operated to release Shafer and M.V.C. Brookover from all personal liability to Chesney but that the property remained subject
to the lien.
The surety who does not sign the renewal note has the burden
of proving that the renewal was intended to relieve him of
liability. "[T]he facts alone of surrender by [the] payee to the
maker of the old note at the time of acceptance of the renewal,
is not sufficient to show a release of the original obligation."' 34
In Peter v. Beverly'35 the court said, with respect to whether a note
was discharged by the acceptance of a renewal note: "the evidence
must certainly be so clear and satisfactory as to leave no reasonable
36
doubt that such was the intention of the parties."'
APPLICAnON oF FT-.s IN CREDrroR's CONTROL

A misapplication of funds held by the creditor, the surety not
assenting, increases the risk on the part of the surety and may
result in releasing the surety of liability. The Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia said, in Hamilton v. Republic Cas.
Co.:' 3 ' "By the great weight of authority, the failure of the plaintiff
to retain ten per cent of the estimate of September 20 would alone
be sufficient under all the circumstances to release the surety.""' 8
From the language used it would appear the West Virginia court
inferred that in such event the surety is released in toto, for the
court quoted with approval the following statement:' 39
133

Id. at 96. (Italics omitted).

Wolfe v. Kelley, 119 W. Va. 428, 194 S.E. 77 (1937).
U.S. (10. Pet.) 532 (1836).
36 Id. at 568.
3
102 W. Va. 32, 135 S.E. 259 (1926).
8
13
Id. at 37, 135 S.E. at 262.
131 Id. at 38, 135 S.E. at 262.

131
13534
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The stipulations in a building contract, that the owner will
make payments as the work progresses ... but will retain a
certain percentage . . . until the work is completed are . . .
covenants for the benefit of the surety, and a violation of these
stipulations by premature payments deemed a material alteration of the contract, whereby the surety is released. The rule
rests upon two reasons-the one is that such a defense deprives
the surety of the security which the owner or principal contractor has agreed to hold for his benefit, and the loss of the
inducement which otherwise would have operated on the
contractor's mind, to induce him to finish the work in accordance with the term of the contract.' 0
However, in a later case the court said where the creditor fails
to apply all moneys and securities of the principal over which he
has control for the surety's benefit, the surety is released pro
tanto.'4
In the case of State v. Smith'42 involving a performance bond,
the creditor had agreed to withhold ten per cent of the amount
due at each installment until the job was completed. The creditor
delivered to the principal debtor equipment to aid in performance
of the contract with $1,140 and debited the ten per cent retained
in this amount. In considering whether the act of the creditor
released the surety the Supreme Court of Appeals recognized that
such payment by the creditor released the surety only to the extent
of the $1,140.'"" On this basis the act of the creditor resulted in
a pro tanto discharge of the surety.
Where collateral is given the creditor by the principal debtor to
secure debts, some of which a surety is liable, the creditor may,
except in the case of a special pledge for a particular debt, apply
the proceeds of the collateral on the debts on which the surety is

not bound."'
SuccEssFruL APP-L By LEss THAN ALT SuB's

Where a judgment is rendered against several sureties and an
appeal is prosecuted successfully on grounds of defenses peculiar
1

40

141
42

1

143

44
-

STEARNS, Sun's'srP " 76 b (3d ed.).
Koblegard Co. v. MaxeU, supra note 116, at 640, 34 S.E.2d at 121.
92W. Va. 12, 114 S.E. 375 (1922).

Id. at 17, 114 S.E. at 377.
Koblegard Co. v. Maxwell, supra note 116, at 642, 34 S.E.2d at 122.
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to them, by one or more, but less than all sureties the non-appealing
sureties are relieved of liability pro tanto to the extent that the
appeal impaired their right of contribution.' 45
In the past, courts of equity have enjoined creditors from collecting from non-appealing sureties of greater amount than those sureties were equitably bound to pay.'46

EFFEcr OF

A Juoc

r AGAINST PINcIPAL DEBTOR

The surety on a bond conditioned to pay any judgment that
might be recovered against his principal is bound by the judgment
when so recovered. The judgment against the principal binds the

47
surety, in the absence of fraud, and determines his liability.1 If

the surety has obligated himself to pay a judgment or fine that
may be imposed on his principal, that judgment or fine is the very
thing which he has agreed to pay, and the surety is estopped, in the
absence of fraud or collusion, to controvert the judgment recovered
against his principal.' 48

"Where the effect of the undertaking of the surety is that he
shall be liable for the result of a suit against his principal, he is
conblusively bound by the judgment in such suit, even though he
is not a party to it and has no notice of it."' 49
SURETY's RIGHTs WHRE PRINCI'AL IS INSOLVENT
AND THE SURETY IS INDEBTED TO THE PRINCIPAL
In 1881 the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in
'
Mattingly v. Sutton 50
stated: "A principal, who is insolvent . . .
cannot collect a debt, which the surety owes him, without first
indemnifying the surety."1 5 ' An assignee will stand in no better
position than his insolvent assignor.'52
14 5 Williams

v. Carr, 76 W. Va. 139, 85 S.E. 69 (1915).

Boughner v. Hall, 24 W. Va. 249 (1884).
147 State v. Myers, 74 W. Va. 488, 82 S.E. 270 (1914); State v. Abbott,
63 W. Va. 189, 61 S.E. 369 (1907); State v. Nutter, 44 W. Va. 385, 30 S.E.
146

67 (1898).
148

State v. Myers, supra note 147.

BRANDT, SurETYSHrP & GUARANTY § 802 (3d ed. 1905); quoted with
approval in Town of Point Pleasant v. Greenlee, 63 W. Va. 207, 213, 60 S.E.
601, 603 (1907).
150 19 W. Va. 19 (1881); Hughes v. McDermitt, 86 W. Va. 86, 102 S.E.
767 (1920); see Bowling v. Bluefield-Graham Fair Ass'n, 84 W. Va. 41, 99
S.E. 184 (1919).
151 Mattingly v. Sutton, 19 W. Va. 19 (1881).
152 Hughes v. McDermitt, supra note 150.
"
149
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Where the insolvency of the principal debtor is shown, the surety
may retain any funds which he holds belonging to the principal
debtor to indemnify himself against his liability as surety.'53
Surry's

RIGHT To SET AsmE FRuDuLENr TRANSFER

The surety may go into equity and have set aside a fraudulent
transfer of property by the principal debtor. A surety is as fully
protected against fraudulent and voluntary conveyances by the
principal debtor as if he held a claim certain and absolute. The
law is that the holder of a claim or demand arising out of a preexisting contract, although it may be contingent, is a creditor
whose rights are affected by such conveyance and such contingent
creditor may avoid them when the contingency happens upon which
the claim depends.' 54 A surety may likewise have a fraudulent
conveyance of a co-surety set aside in equity as an aid to enforcing
his right of contribution.'5 5
QuiA TnmN
If a surety, after the debt has matured, has any apprehension
of loss or injury from the delay of the creditor to enforce the
debt against the principal debtor, he may by the way of a bill
quia timet compel the debtor to discharge the debt or other obligation. That is, before the surety has paid anything he has the right,
on principle of quia timet, to sue to compel the principal debtor
to pay the debt to his relief.'56
Svurry's

w
wiGHTS
i EspE Cr

To CoLrLrEAT

HELD BY CrEDITOR

The creditor is not required to proceed against collateral of the
principal debtor before proceeding against the surety.' 7 The
surety is fully protected with respect to the collateral in that upon
payment of the indebtedness by the surety he would be subrogated
to the rights of the creditor with respect to the collateral.'""
'5' Mattingly v. Sutton, supra note 151.
' 5 4 Carr v. Davis, supra 106.

I-" Charter v. Maxwell, 132 W. Va. 282, 52 S.E.2d 753 (1949); Hawker v.
Moore, 40 W. Va. 52, 20 S.E. 819 (1894).
156 Carr v. Davis, supra note 106, at 528, 63 S.E. at 326; Neal v. Buffington, 42 W. Va. 327, 329, 26 S.E. 172, 173 (1896); Knight v. Charter, supra

note 112, at 428; Mattingly v. Sutton, supra note 151, at 30.
1578 Post v. Baily & Co., 68 NV. Va. 434, 69 S.E. 910 (1910).
15 Id. at 436, 69 S.E. at 911.
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Some states have enacted laws which require the creditor who,
"holds other security of the principal, to exhaust it before going
on the property of the surety; or, in case ... [the creditor] has
obtained judgment and execution against both principal and surety,
to . . . [require satisfaction] first out of the property of the
principal" debtor.' 9 Such a policy has not been enacted into law
in West Virginia; the surety is still primarily liable, as he was at
common law. The West Virginia courts have recognized that
where the creditor is seeking to enforce a lien against land of both
the principal debtor and surety, "all parties being before the
court, equity will sell first the lands of the principal, provided
it does not unreasonably delay the creditor in the collection of
his debt." This is done to prevent circuity of actions and multiplicity of suits.'6
The creditor need not proceed against the principal debtor before
proceeding against the surety. The creditor may at the same time
proceed against the collateral and the sureties.'
The courts will not, "at the instance of a surety, stay the hand
of a creditor and require him to first resort to his lien on the
lands of the principal debtor before enforcing his remedy . . .
against the surety."' 62
A creditor who holds securities for an indebtedness is under a
dutyi to the surety to use due care and diligence in the management and collection of the collateral securities.' 63 The failure of
the creditor to perform his duties with respect to the collateral
security will release the" surety to the extent of the loss he sustained by the negligence of the creditor with respect to the collateral security to the same extent he would have been released by
the positive act of the creditor.'6 4 This is not to say that the principal debtor also might not be released to the same extent where he
was not a party to causing or aiding in causing the loss to the
creditor or sureties.
When a creditor obtains a judgment against both the principal
debtor and the surety, the surety may assert his equity against the
'9
140

Id. at 437, 69 S.E. at 912.
Ibid.

at 436, 69 S.E. at 911; Horton v. Bond 69 Va. (28 Grat.) 815
(1877); Shenandoah Valley Nat'l Bank v. Bates, 20 W. Va. 210 (1882).
162 Post v. Bailey & Co., supra note 157, at 435, 69 S.E. at 911.
163 Colerider v. Central Nat'l Bank, 128 W. Va. 520, 37 S.E.2d 466
(1946); First Nat'l Bank v. Kittle, 69 W. Va. 171, 71 S.E. 109 (1911).
164 First Nat'l Bank v. Kittle, supra note 163, at 174, 71 S.E. at 110.
(

1 Id.
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principal debtor and obtain a decree that first subjects the principal
debtor's land to the satisfaction of the judgment in cases where all
parties to the transaction and the land in question are before
the court."'

This principle was applied in First Nat'l Bank v. Kittle'66 where
the facts disclosed that the principal debtor obtained money from
a bank upon (1) an obligation of himself and two sureties and (2)
additional security by the way of an assignment of money to become due the principal debtor. Because of the failure of the
creditor to give notice of the assignment and to take such other
steps as might have been necessary to preserve its right and the
rights of the sureties, the same having been lost or surrendered,
the sureties were discharged of liability to the extent of the loss
suffered by such neglect.
This principle also was recognized in Colerider v. Central Nat'l
Bank'6 where the issue was raised as to whether the bank which
held the note should have protected the collateral in its care by
taking steps to prevent the wrongful removal of timber from
property securing the debts. The court resolved the issue by stating: "Generally speaking, the law favors a surety or grantor, and
requires reasonable diligence on the part of the holder of collateral
to protect the same ... ."68 The surety was held released to the

extent the security held by the creditor had been impaired.
One should not lose sight of the fact that the creditor who holds
collateral belonging to the principal debtor holds the collateral
not only in his own right but also in effect as trustee for the surety.
When the principal debtor has given securities to the surety to
indemnify the surety against loss, the surety likewise holds the
collateral not only in his own behalf but also in trust for the
' That is, a creditor may claim the benefit of securities
creditor. 69
given by the principal debtor to idemnify the surety which properly
belonged to the principal debtor."' The rule is not applicable
Post v. Bailey & Co., supra note 157.
166 Supra note 163.
167 128 W. Va. 520, 137 S.E.2d 466 (1946).
168 Colerider v. Central Nat'l Bank, supra note 163, at 528, 37 S.E.2d at
165

469.

169 Lewis, Hubbard & Co. v. Toney, 76 W. Va. 80, 82, 85 S.E. 30, 31
(1915). By the terms of the deed of trust the sureties were indemnified
against having to pay the note; therefore, it was not necessary for them to
pay it prior to perfecting their rights against the principal debtors.
170 New Martinsville Bank v. Hart, 103 W. Va. 290, 137 S.E. 222 (1927).
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where the property given to idemnify the surety belonged to one
other than the principal debtor. '
Where the principal debtor executed a deed of trust to realty to
idemnify the surety, the creditor was held to be entitled to the
benefit of the deed of trust where the principal debtor and surety
were both insolvent.' 2
Where there is a foreclosure of a deed of trust on realty given by
the principal debtor to the surety to idemnify the surety against
loss, the proceeds should be paid to the creditor and not to the
surety. Otherwise, the surety might not pay the creditor, and the
principal debtor, still being liable to the creditor, might be required to pay the obligation a second time."'
A judgment creditor who has a number of judgments against a
debtor is free to
pursue his remedies by execution and otherwise for the collection of the judgments in which there are no sureties ....
[I]f property be taken on execution on . . . other judgments
and released... [this would not] release the sureties in such
other judgments, nor work a discharge or satisfaction of the
judgments on which they were issued, so as to give priority to
such others in favor of the sureties." 4
Where a judgment is taken by the creditor against the principal
debtor and property of the principal debtor sufficient to pay the
judgment is levied against, the release of such property from levy
releases the surety.' 5 The aforementioned result obtains whether
the release of the lien by substitution of a note for the judgment
was intended as payment or satisfaction of the judgment. When
a judgment is taken against both the principal debtor and the
surety and a levy is made on the principal's property followed by
a release of the lien, the surety has the equitable right that the
judgment be not used against the surety to maintain a lien
against his property.
,7) W. F. Shawver Sons Co. v. Board of Edue., 117 W. Va. 531, 186 S.E.
307 (1936).
172 New Martinsvflle Bank v. Hart, supra note 170; 1 Pommoy, EQuTY
JURISPRUDENCE § 352 (5th ed. 1941).
73 Lewis, Hubbard & Co. v. Toney, supra note 169, at 81, 85 S.E. at 31.
174 George v. Crim, 66 W. Va. 421, 422, 66 S.E. 526, 527 (1909).
, 7"Williams
v. Brown, 70W. Va. 472, 74 S.E. 409 (1912).
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Where the creditor prosecutes a claim to judgment against the
principal debtor he may, after having placed an execution in the
hands of the proper officer and prior to actual levy, recall the same
and direct the officer not to levy the same without releasing the
surety of liability as no lien has by such action been released." 6
The surety is
entitled to expect, not only that the principal shall save him
from harm . . . but moreover that the principal shall allow

him the benefit of the means of payment which the . . .
[principal] has placed in the hands or within the power of
the creditor .... [A surety may] enforce against his principal
all securities which the... [principal provided to the] creditor;
for the purpose of ... [making the surety vhole] if payment
has been made; and it is not in the mouth of the creditor to
object in the one case or in the other to the surety's standing
precisely in his shoes, on the contrary the creditor, in relation
to such sureties may be said with truth to be trustee of the
surety, and if he acts unfaithfully, he not only fails in his duty
as such, but violates the right of the surety against his principal. If therefore, he releases or perverts, or defeats such
securities, he exempts the surety to the extent of the loss
thereby sustained.'""
APPLICATION OF PAYMMISI

A payment by a debtor of a sum without direction as to which
of two or more accounts it is to be applied may be applied by the
creditor to whichever account he desires.' 78 Likewise, where the
debtor is indebted to the creditor on more than one account and
neither the debtor nor the sureties have directed the creditor with
respect to certain credits, the creditor may apply such credit to
either of the debts according to his pleasure, unless the creditor
was cognizant of the fact that said credit was obtained with
money collected by the principal debtor from taxes for which
the surety would be liable if the principal debtor did not account
to the creditor for them.' 9
Once the debtor has designated an application to be made of a
payment or, in the absence of such designation, once the creditor
Martin v. Charter, 22 W. Va. 427 (1883).
Johnson v. Young, 20 W. Va. 614, 661 (1882).
1 Koblegard Co. v. Maxwell, 127 W. Va. 630, 34 S.E.2d 116 (1945).
179 Grafton v. Reed, 34 W. Va. 172, 12 S.E. 767 (1890).
176
177

78
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has applied the funds, the application cannot be1 80revoked without
the consent of both the debtor and the creditor.
"A debt is not necessarily discharged or extinguished by payment by a stranger except where ratified by the debtor.' 81
SlREzTY's RIcHT TO RECOVEa INTF-E5

AND

COsT OF LITIGATION

A surety who pays the debt of his principal is entitled to interest
on the amount paid on behalf of his principal even though part
of the sum paid represents interest on the principal obligation.
This is true even though the surety was a subrogee of the
creditor.1 82 The creditor's "recovery against a principal and surety
in a bond for the payment of money is not limited to the penalty
but may exceed it, so far as necessary to include interest from the
time of the breach."' 3
The issue of whether a surety is entitled to recover from the
principal the cost of litigation is not as clear. Each case must
stand on its own.
[T]he principal is not liable for costs and expenses unnecessarily incurred by the surety in litigation carried on by him
in order to get rid of his liability or defeat the efforts of a
party seeking to enforce . . . [the claim]. . . . And it is incumbent on the surety, seeking to recover from his principal
costs and expenses incurred in litigation to show that the
litigation was entered into in good faith and upon reasonable
grounds, and was a measure of defense, necessary to the
interest of both parties, and was calculated so to result.'8 4
SUBROGATION

By the doctrine of subrogation one who has the right to pay
a debt for which he is liable and which should have been paid by
another after payment is entitled to exercise all the remedies
which -the creditor possessed against the one who by all rights
should have paid.' 5 The right also is extended to a co-surety who
Wait v. Homestead Bldg. Ass'n, 81 W. Va. 702, 95 S.E. 203 (1918).
Hughes v. McEl*ee, 117 W. Va. 410, 412, 185 S.E. 688, 689 (1936);
Neely v. Jones, 16 W. Va. 625, 641 (1880).
182 Cranmer v. McSwords, 26 W. Va. 412 (1885).
111 Perry v. Horn, 22 W. Va. 381, 386 (1883).
184 Cranmer v. MeSwords, supra note 182, at 417.
185 Blair v. Mounts, 41 W. Va. 706, 24 S.E. 620 (1896).
180
181
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pays the principal debtor's obligation
in order to obtain contri86
butions from his co-sureties.'
The early decisions by West Virginia courts held that when
payment or release is made, the debt is dead in a court of law
but remains alive in equity for the benefit of the surety or cosurety. Similarly, it was held that when a judgment against the
principal debtor is paid by the surety the judgment is ended at
law, but equity keeps it alive for the benefit of the surety. '
Where an obligation is discharged by one for the benefit of
another whose duty it was to pay the same, the law creates an
obligation in favor of the one who pays against the party who
by all rights should have paid.
A bill based on a claim of subrogation to the rights of another
is defective if it fails to allege the relationship of the parties out
of which the right of subrogation arose.' 88
A judgment lien on the principal debtor's property, even after
it has been formally released on the record, remains alive in equity
'
for the protection of the surety's rights. 89
In cases where the
equity of the surety is latent the surety does not prevail over the
rights of a subsequent bona fide purchaser of property from the
principal debtor. A surety who pays a judgment is subrogated to
all the rights of the judgment and lien resulting from such judgment for so much of the judgment as was paid by the surety.'9 °
The surety is subrogated to all such rights without any assignment
of the judgment or liens and may enforce the lien against the
principal debtor's property for his own benefit.'
When a surety pays a judgment of his principal debtor to the
state, the surety is subrogated to the rights of the state and may
enforce the lien of the state for his benefit without making the
state a party to the suit.' 92 Logic dictates that the subrogee would
be subrogated to any priorities or preferences granted to the state.'93
8
6 Gooch v. Gooch, 70 W. Va. 38, 41, 73 S.E. 56, 58 (1911) (dictum).
'8 7 1d. at 42, 73 S.E. at 58.
188 Haines v. Kuykendall, 120 W. Va. 549, 199 S.E. 449 (1938).
189 Gooch v. Gooch, supra note 186, at 42, 73 S.E. at 58.
190 Bassett v. Streight, 78 W. Va. 262, 88 S.E. 848 (1916).
'9'
92 George v. Crim, supra note 174.
1 Pickens v. Wood, 57 W. Va. 480, 50 S.E. 818 (1905).
193 United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Central Trust Co., 95 W. Va. 458,
1

121 S.E. 430 (1924).
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It has been recognized that the creditor's remedies on a note
secured by a mortgage or deed of trust may be barred, but that
fact does not bar the lien of that mortgage or deed of trust, the
note being one thing, the mortgage or deed of trust another; the
one dead, the other yet alive. In such a case the creditor can not
successfully maintain an action on the note, but may resort to his
security for satisfaction. When a surety pays the debt, so far as
subrogation is involved the surety steps into the shoes of the
creditor, and so long as the creditor's right against the principal
debtor would not be barred neither will the right of the suretyagainst the principal debtor be barred, for the surety is subrogated
to all the positions and
rights the creditor would have had he
94
remained the creditor.'
The surety is not subrogated to the right of the creditor until
the creditor has been fully satisfied. The surety cannot compel
the creditor to assign or cede or in any way detract from his
securities until the creditor has been fully satisfied.' 95
It has been said that a surety may not make a profit at the
expense of his principal when the surety discharges the debt for
a consideration of a lesser value than the debt for which it was
taken. In Maftthews v. Hall'96 the court noted that,
[I]f the surety discharges the debt of his principal, in whole
or in part for any sum less than the full amount he so discharges, he can, in the absence of an express contract, recover
from -his principal only the amount actually paid by him
. . . . [The surety should] not be allowed to speculate out of
his principal .... He occupies in that regard the same position as an agent .... It is . . . . [the duty of the surety] to
make the best terms he can for his principal . . . . [If the
surety] pays in depreciated bank notes, or other money which
is below par, but is taken by the creditor at par, he can
recover from the principal .... the amount actually paid by
him and not the amount extinguished by the payment.
Where two persons purchase property, with the understanding
between them that each will pay an equal part of the purchase
price and they execute a joint note for the purchase price, they
Gooch v. Gooch, supra note 186, at 42, 73 S.E. at 58.
195 Neal v. Buffington, 42 W. Va. 327, 26 S.E. 172 (1896).
194

196

21 W. Va. 510 (1883).
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are sureties for each other to take the extent of one-half the joint

obligation." ' The suretyship relation which is apparent on such
facts results in an equitable lien in favor of the party who pays
more than his share of the debt upon the interest of the other to
secure the excess. However, if one sells his interest in the property
to a bona fide purchaser without notice of the equity of the other
'
party, the purchaser's rights prevail over any rights of the surety. 98
Where an obligation of the principal and surety is secured by
a mortgage on the principal's property and the record discloses
satisfaction of the mortgage without disclosing by whom payment
was made, the purchaser, without notice to the contrary, may
properly assume the debt was paid by the principal debtor. ' 99
However, if the purchaser knows or the record discloses that the
debt was paid by one who was in fact surety for the principal
debtor, such purchaser does not acquire unencumbered title to
the property for the surety would, as the result of his payment
of the indebtedness, be subrogated to the security interest in the
property to protect his right to reimbursement from the principal
debtor."° Any release by the creditor of the lien would under
these circumstances be in violation of the surety's rights and
would be invalid as against one other than a bona fide purchaser
of the property.
Where the record discloses that if payment had been made
by a certain person he would be entitled to subrogation, a purchaser is not required to look beyond the record to determine
whether payment was in fact made by such person." '
In Perkins v. Hall"2 a party became a surety by co-signing a
negotiable note; the surety paid the note. The effect of this payment upon his rights against the principal was in issue. At the
time of the decision the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law,
not the Uniform Commercial Code, was in force in West Virginia.
As a preliminary to consideration of the Perkis case it is noted
that under the Negotiable Instruments Law an endorser on a
negotiable instrument is secondarily liable, while a co-maker is
19 7

Wolford v. Bias, 79 W. Va. 349, 90 S.E. 875 (1916).
198 Id. at 353, 90 S.E. at 876.
199 Ibid.

200 Ibid.
201
202

Id. at 354, 90 S.E. at 876.

123 W. Va. 707, 17 S.E.2d 795 (1941).
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primarily liable. By the terms of the Negotiable Instruments Law
payment by a person secondarily liable did not discharge the
instrument. Formerly, the West Virginia Code( provided: "The
person 'primarily' liable on an instrument is the person who, by
the terms of the instrument, is absolutely required to pay the
same .... ."Under the Negotiable Instruments Law did payment
by a surety who was a co-signer of a negotiable instrument
discharge the instrument? The Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia in answering this question in the affirmative said: "We
think it has always been the law that the payment of a negotiable
instrument, at or after maturity, by the makers thereof, or any of
them, extinguishes the note, and nothing in the negotiable instrument law weakens that proposition."" ' If the instrument be discharged the surety can not base his action against the principal
debtor on the instrument but would have to base his action against
the principal debtor on some other theory.
The fact set forth in the Perkins case disclose that Perkins, J.
Hall and L. Hall were all primarily liable on the note. The court
said the surety, who was primarily liable on the note, having paid
the note, could not maintain an action on the note as it had been
discharged by payment.
The court speaking through Judge Ford, quoted from Judge
Snyder's opinion in Conrad v. Buck,

205

saying:

It is well settled, that where a surety pays a debt of his
principal, which is evidenced by bond, the surety is not
substituted to the rights of the creditor so far as to make him
a bond creditor. The payment completely discharges and
destroys the bond and leaves the surety to his remedy on his
account for money paid for the use of his principal. The only
contract available to the surety after such discharge of the
bond, is an implied promise that the debtor will repay him
the amount so paid for his use .... "'
A careful reading of the Conrad case will disclose that this
statement was dicta and was used in an analogy to a case which
was concerned with the dissolution of a partnership.
203 ch. 46, art. 17, § 2 (Miehie 1961), repealed by W. VA.
art. 10 (Michie Supp. 1965).
204 Perkins v. Hall, supra note 202, at 715, 17 S.E.2d at 800.
205 21 W. Va. 396, 410 (1883) (dictum).
2 6
Perkins v. Hall, supra note 202, at 715, 17 S.E.2d at 800.
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As additional justification for its decision in the Perkins case,
the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia alluded to a
Virginia case"° ' in which it was held that when a surety pays a
note, he "can not take an assignment thereof to himself so as to
enforce the note as such against his principal, but would have to
rely on the implied undertaking of his principal to indemnify
him"20 8
The West Virginia court was referring to the West Virginia
Code 9 under which a surety, guarantor or endorser, who pays
a judgment in whole or in part awarded on account of such liability,
may, by motion in the court in which the judgment was rendered,
obtain a judgment against any person against whom such right
of action exists for the amount so paid with interest stated. The
statute merely provides a remedy in addition to that which might
be involved under the equitable powers of the court providing
for contribution or subrogation.
Section 3-601 of the UNoIO
CoMaMRcIAL CODE2" 0 speaks of
discharge of "any party" rather than discharge of "the instrument"
as did Section 119 of the UNoR NEGOTABLE INsThUMENT Acr.' '
Subsection (1) of Section 3-601 of the Code provides: "The extent
of the discharge of any party from liability on an instrument is
governed by the sections on (a) payment or satisfaction (Section
3-603) .. .or (b) . . ."etc.21 2 Subsection (2) of Section 3-603

of the Code provides: 'Tayment or satisfaction may be made with
the consent of the holder by any person including a stranger to
the instrument. Surrender of the instrument to such a person gives
him the rights of a transferee (Section 3-201) ...."213 When one

refers to Subsection (1) of Section 3-201 of the Code, he will note
that "transfer of an instrument vest [sic] in the transferee such
rights as the transferor has therein .

. ." Is it not possible in

reading these three sections of the Code together to conclude that
under the Code a surety who is a co-maker may sue the principal
debtor on the instrument which the surety who is a co-maker has
paid? If so, what is the limit of the recovery by the surety who
207 Grizzle v. Fletcher, 127 Va. 663, 105 S.E. 457 (1920).
20
8Id. at 664, 105 S.E. at 458.

ch.

209
45, art. 1,
2
1OW.VA. CODE
2
11W. VA. CODE

212 W. VA. CODE:
213 W. VA. CODE

§ 4 (Michie 1961).
ch. 46, art. 3, § 601 (Michie Supp. 1965).

ch. 46, art. 3, § 601 (Michie Supp. 1965).
ch. 46, art. 3, § 603 (2) (Michie Supp. 1965).
ch. 46,'art. 3, § 201 (Michie Supp. 1965).
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is a co-maker in the event the surety discharged the instrument
by the way of a compromise settlement for less than its face
amount? Had the creditor so desired might he have recovered
from the principal debtor the face amount of the instrument?
Unless section 4 of article 1 of chapter 45 of the WEST VnMCINIA
CoD : has been impliedly repealed by the adoption of the Commercial Code, which does not seem to be the case, the surety is
limited to recovering the amount it cost him to discharge his obligation on the instrument. The applicable portion of section 4
provides that where the surety pays, he shall
be substituted to and become the owner of all of the rights
and remedies of the creditor for the enforcement and collection of the amount or amounts so paid . . . . The provisions
of this section are cumulative, and are intended to protect
the rights of any person secondarily liable to the extent to
which he has satisfied the obligation of the person primarily
liable ....
From the content of this section it appears that the words
"secondary" and "primary" are used to designate a "surety" or
"principal" irrespective of whether the surety signed as co-maker or
endorser.
It is reasonable to conclude that under the protisions of the
Code the surety who has discharged his obligation to the creditor
may maintain an action on the negotiable instrument against the
principal debtor as the creditor might have done, but the surety
would be limited in his recovery to the amount it cost him to
discharge the obligation.
[The] . . . payment of a judgment by one of the judgment
debtors extinguishes the judgment law . .. [A] creditor could
not sell the judgment to one of the judgment debtors so as
to keep it alive at law, although the equitable remedy of
subrogation to the rights of the creditors in favor of a surety,
'1 4
or for contribution, was not . . . affected.
.The facts in Hughes v. McElwee" 5 disclose that the administrator of an estate recovered a judgment in covenant against
214

Perkins v. Hall, supra note 202, at 716, 17 S.E.2d at 795; Greenbrier
Valley Bank v. Holt, 114 W. Va. 363, 171 S.E. 906 (1933).
21- Supra note 181.
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Hughes and McElwee. M. Hughes, not a party to the action,
borrowed from McElwee the sum to pay the judgment which had
been rendered against her son and McElwee. The court found
that M. Hughes intended to pay the debt; therefore, the judgment
was extinguished as to her son, the principal obligor. The obligation of the surety was automatically extinguished because the
surety was liable only so long as the debt of the principal was not
extinguished.
INDEMNIFICA.TON

The statement of facts in National Surety Co. v. Conley" 6
disclosed that the National Surety Company was surety on Conley's bond. Conley had agreed to indemnify the surety company
against loss, including counsel fees, which the surety company
might incur as the result of its undertaking. One McGinnis, a
deputy sheriff appointed by Conley, executed his bond to Conley
with the National Surety Company as his surety. The surety company sought to recover from Conley the expense it incurred as
the result of a wrongful act committed by Deputy Sheriff McGinnis.
The court in affirming the decision of the lower court against
the surety company said: "Had this litigation been confined alone
to the bond of the sheriff his liability for counsel fees would have
been plain . . .. The deputy's bond provided that the sheriff
was to be "saved harmless" by reason of the deputy's appointment.217
CON'TRMUrION
The rights between co-sureties grow out of the implied understanding that each co-surety will pay his share of the common
indebtedness and not from the note evidencing their obligation to
the creditor.
The right of one surety to seek contribution from a co-surety
was originally a matter of equitable cognizance. For many years
the right of one surety to seek contributions from co-sureties also
has been recognized as a legal right enforceable in the law
courts.

216

218

2 17

21

108 W. Va. 589, 152 S.E. 3 (1930).

Id. at 592, 152 S.E. at 5.

'Weimer v. Talbot, 56 W. Va. 257, 262, 49 S.E. 372, 374 (1904); 1

BRANDT, SurETYsmp & GuA.RA-ry § 289 (3d ed. 1905).
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The right of a surety to recover contribution from a co-surety in
the law courts is limited to an aliquot part of the debt. At law
this amount is determined by dividing the whole number of
co-sureties, both solvent and insolvent, into the amount of the
debt paid." 9 In Selvey's Exr v. Armstron's Adm'r 2 20 the personal
representative of a deceased judgment debtor, the deceased having
been surety on another's obligation, was permitted to recover from
the estate of his co-surety by the way of contribution.
In a court of equity the surety who has paid the principal
debtor's debt is entitled to contribution from his solvent co-sureties
based pro rata on the number of solvent co-sureties." ' While the
West Virginia court did not consider the matter, decisions in
other states indicate that the equitable doctrine in relation to contributions also excludes from consideration solvent and insolvent
co-sureties who are non-residents and not amenable to service of
process.
A surety who seeks contribution from a co-surety is entitled to
recover interest on the amount to which he is entitled by the way
of contribution from the date of payment by the surety seeking
contribution. 2"

Where the principal debtor was insolvent and one of two cosureties paid the credit in full, the one who paid was entitled
to contribution from his co-surety, and in order to protect and to
enforce his right of contribution the court set aside a fraudulent
deed made by his co-surety. Other creditors of the defendant
co-surety had no right to complain. The debt had in truth not
been paid, because it was not paid by the one ultimately bound.
Rather, it was paid by another, who became the co-surety's creditor
in due course of law.223
A surety who has paid his principal debtor's debt, or more than
his equitable part thereof, is subrogated to all the rights and
remedies of the creditor against a co-surety in order to enforce
1,9 Pickens v. Wood, supra note 192, at 490, 50 S.E. at 822; Weimer v.
Talbot, supra note 218, at 262, 49 S.E. at 374; Dent v. Wai's Adm'r, 9 W. Va.

41, 45220(1876).
73 W. Va.

13, 79 S.E. 1019 (1913).
221 Weimer v. Talbot, supra note 218, at 262, 49 S.E. at 374; Dent v.
Wait's
222Adm'r, supra note 219, at 45.

Wolfe v. Kelley, 119 W. Va. 428, 194 S.E. 77 (1937); Piedmont
Grocery Co. v. Hawkins, 87 W. Va. 38, 104 S.E. 736 (1920); Weimer v.
Talbot, supra note 218, at 268, 49 S.E. at 376.
223 Hawker v. Moore, 40 W. Va. 49, 51, 20 S.E. 848, 849 (1894).
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his right to insist that his co-surety pay a share of the indebtedness.
Such right is an equitable demand for money which may be
assigned and enforced by the assignee.2"
MODI-ICATON OF ComNaMar

A modification of a contract on which there is a gratuitous surety
without the surety's consent discharges the surety in toto. The
modification must result from a binding agreement between the
creditor and the principal.225
Where a contract authorizes additions, deductions or changes in
the work to be done as may be necessary and makes a fair allowance or deduction on account thereof, the surety on the contract
is not discharged by modification of the contract, in accordance
with its terms.226 Where the surety did not reserve the right to
determine the price of any changes in the work or materials to
be furnished under the terms of the contract, the surety had
22 7
entrusted the determination of this matter to the principal debtor.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia by way of
dicta has said that powers and responsibilities of a public officer
may be enlarged or diminished by legislation without affecting
the liability of a surety on the public officer's bond. In such
cases the surety is deemed by law to have entered into the
contract with knowledge that the public officer's obligations are
subject to change by the legislature. The surety has no right to
object to changes in the duties of his principal debtor to which
he has previously consented. 2 8
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has stated
that a surety of an officer of a private corporation is presumed to
know that the shareholders and board of directors of the corporation may enlarge or diminish the scope of an agent or officer.
Such a surety obligates himself for the care, skill, diligence and
honesty of the principal in the bond respecting the duties imposed
on the agent or officer of the corporation at the time of the execu224
Weimer
22

v. Talbot, supra note 219, at 261, 49 S.E. at 373.
Koblegard Co. v. Maxwell, 127 W. Va. 630, 34 S.E.2d 116 (1945)
(dictum).
226 State v. Smith, 92 W. Va. 12, 18, 114 S.E. 375, 377 (1922).
227 State v. Smith, supra note 226, at 19, 114 S.E. at 377; State v.
Hudson Paving & Constr. Co., 91 W. Va. 387, 395, 113 S.E. 251, 254 (1922).
228 Wait v. Homestead Bldg. Ass'n, 76 W. Va. 431, 85 S.E. 637 (1915)
(dictum).
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tion of the bond and also for such duties as subsequently may be
developed upon him in the exercise of corporate powers.22 9
It is well settled that if the contract between the owner and
the contractor permits alterations to be made in the work to
be done, or if the bond itself permits the alterations the surety
will not be discharged by reason of a material alteration made
without his express consent, where such alteration is one conternplated by the terms of the stipulation permitting alterations.2 °
Where the bond of an officer or agent of a corporation binds
him in only a general way to "well and truly perform the duties
of the said office during his term . . ." the surety on that bond
is liable not only for defaults in the exercise of authority which
the principal had at the time the bond was executed but also for
defaults in the exercise of authority subsequently granted. This
applies not only to authorized acts but also to unauthorized, ratified
acts. " ' In holding a surety liable for the defaults of an agentofficer of a corporation, the agent-officer's authority having been
modified after the suretyship relation was created, the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia said:
The limits of his [principal-employee] potential authority
were those of the corporation itself, respecting matters pertaining to the treasurer's functions, such as the receipt and
custody of its funds. Rules governing the liability of sureties
in bonds collateral to clearly defined and limited contracts,
32
undertaking to do specific acts . . . are . . . not applicable.
CRMrrOR ESTOPPED TO D.NY NoTE UNPAID

Where the creditor states that a note has been paid, when in
fact it has not, the surety may well be misled thereby to his detriment in that he might fail to take certain steps. In such a case
the surety may plead an estoppel in pas as a defense even though
233
the statement was a mistake, and there was no fraud practiced.
229

Id. at 441, 85 S.E. at 642.

Hudson Paving & Constr. Co., supra note 227, at 395, 113 S.E. at 254. 440, 85 S.E. at 641.
231 Wait v. Homestead Bldg. Ass'n, supra note 228, at
232 Ibid.
233 Citizens Trust & Guar. Co. v. Goff, 81 W. Va. 366, 370, 94 S.E. 756,
757 (1917); Poling v. Maddox, 41 W. Va. 779, 785, 24 S.E. 999, 1001 (1896);
Bates v. Swiger, 40 W. Va. 420, 21 S.E. 874 (1895); see also 1 BRANDT,
StrsETsm' & GuvARAuv § 245 (3d ed. 1905).
230 21 R.C.L. 1012, which is cited with approval in State v.
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The surety should be discharged only where he can show that the
principal debtor was solvent at the time the surety was led to
believe that the indebtedness to the creditor had been paid. Otherwise, the surety would be unable to show that.he had relied on the
creditor's statement to his detriment.23' The creditors may likewise
mislead the surety through a third party, as where he gave a-receipt
to the principal debtor showing the principal debtor had settled
with him which was in turn shown to the surety by the principal
debtor. 5'
UsURiY
Where the plea of usury is not available to the principal debtor,
it will not be available to the surety. 36 A note was signed in Ohio
calling for interest at the rate of eight per cent per annum, which
was lawful under the Ohio law. It was signed by the surety in
Virginia where the maximum lawful rate was six per cent per
annum. At the time the surety signed the note the Virginia law
of usury rendered the contract void. The court found the agreement
to be an Ohio contract, valid under the usury laws of that state,
and denied to the surety the defense of usury under the Virginia
laws. If the principal cannot attack the validity of the contract
the surety may not.
The court cited with approval the New York case of Rosa v.
Butterfield.""-A New York statute denied a corporation the right
to set up the defense of usury; therefore, notes of a railroad
company were not usurious and could be enforced against the
company and the guarantors. The New York court said: "This is
equivalent to saying, as the corporation could not set up the defense
of usury, neither could the surety of said corporation set up such
a defense."238
Dumss
There appears to be only one reported case in West Virginia
where duress practiced on the principal debtor was successfully
234

Citizens Trust & Guar. Co. v. Goff, supra note 233, at 373, 94 S.E. at

758 (dictum).

235 Citizens Trust & Guar. Co. v. Coff, supra note 233.
236
237
238

Pugh v. Cameron's Adm'r, 11 W. Va. 523 (1877).
33 N.Y. 665 (1865).
Pugh v. Cameron's Adm'r, supra note 236, at 531.
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asserted by a surety. In the case of Bank of Clinchburg v. Carter239
the accommodation indorser on a note was sued. The facts disclosed that the payee had threatened the principal debtor with
criminal prosecution for having engaged in certain improper activities. The note was still in the hands of the payee.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia adopted the
view that duress practiced by the holder upon the principal obligor,
the maker of the note, may be asserted as a defense by the surety
who was ignorant of the duress at the time he became a surety.
This view is favored by a majority of jurisdictions.
In an earlier case24 the court had found that it was not duress
to threaten one with arrest unless threat was made with an improper purpose. The court held that it was not an improper purpose where the wife had threatened her husband with prosecution
for non-support.
SEr-OFF
As a general proposition the law courts will not permit the
set-off of a joint liability against an individual liability nor the
set-off of an individual claim against a joint obligation. However,
a separate demand may be set-off against joint and several
claims.241
In Johnsores Ex'r v. Johnson's Heirs24 the court held that a
surety of an insolvent estate may set-off a debt owed by the estate
for which he is liable as a surety. This case is of unusual interest
because the degree of the insolvency of the estate had not at the
time of this litigation been determined. The court held that when
the amount the surety may have to pay is not known, the surety
has the right to protection from the creditor. In such a case the
surety is liable to the creditor only for the unpaid portion of the
debt after the creditor has received his pro rata share of the estate.
In the law courts a surety has been denied the right to set-off
against the creditor a claim which the principal debtor has
against the creditor. The set-off in this case has been said to be
purely equitable.
229
101 W. Va. 669, 133 S.E. 370 (1926).
24 0
Bolyard v. Bolyard, 79 W. Va. 554, 91 S.E. 529 (1917).
241 Waugh v. Hood, 120 W. Va. 291, 198 S.E. 515 (1938);
Elliott v.
Bell, 37 W. Va. 834, 17 S.E. 399 (1893).
242 83 W. Va. 593, 98 S.E. 812
(1919); see also Beard v. Beard, 25
W. Va. 486 (1885).
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Where one is indebted to an insolvent creditor and is also surety
for that insolvent party's debt, one may enjoin the collection of
his indebtedness until he has been indemnified against his liability
as a surety.'- This is in effect creating an equitable set-off of an
obligation which may not as yet be due against a matured claim
of an insolvent creditor. Similarly, where the surety discharges his
liability as surety to such creditor he may set-off, in equity, such
payment against his indebtedness to such creditor. An assignee of,
such creditor will stand in no better position than the insolvent
assignor. 44
When an action of debt is brought against a surety alone on a
joint and several penal bond, conditioned that the principal as an
agent would faithfully pay over certain moneys to his employee,
the court expressed the view that the surety could "neither offset
nor recoup a debt due to the principal by the plaintiff for services
as such agent . . . when receiving such money."24 The court in
reaching its conclusion contrasted the case of Baltimore & Ohio
R.R. v. Jameson."' The court recognized that in the Jameson case
it had held that a set-off for services rendered by the principal was
allowed. The court said:
But this by no means establishes that the surety, when sued
alone on a joint and several obligation, can plead as a set-off
any demand due from the plaintiff to a person not a party to
the suit, even though that person stands in the relation of
principal to the defendant as a surety. 47
It is elementary that when two parties execute a joint and several
obligation to a third person, as where one is a principal debtor
and the other a surety, the creditor may at his option treat it as a
joint obligation of the principal debtor and the surety and sue
them both, or he may treat it as a several obligation and sue only
one of them. In the latter instance and in the absence of a statute,
the surety is precluded from asserting any defense which belongs
only to the principal debtor who has not been joined. 48
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Huhes v. McDermitt, 86 W. Va. 86, 102 S.E. 767 (1920).
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Baltimore & O.R.R. Co. v. Bitner, 15 W. Va. 455 (1879).
13 W. Va. 833 (1878).
Baltimore & O.R.R. Co. v. Bittner, supra note 245, at 461.
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CONCLUSION

Notwithstanding the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court
of Appeals of West Virginia in the multitude of cases involving
principles of suretyship law, many problems in this area of the
law remain unresolved. In view of the adoption of the Uniform
Commercial Code in which many problems relating to commercial
transactions of other types have been anticipated and resolved,
it would be desirable for the Legislature of West Virginia to
re-exmnine the antiquated statutes relating to suretyship law with
the idea of enacting a comprehensive suretyship code. Such code
would fill the present voids in the law and would codify the law
which has developed in this area by decisions of the courts.
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